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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
"~HIT~IORE OXYGE~ CO~IP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-YS.-
~TATE TAX CO~I~IISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH and 
GRA~T A. BRO\YX. ELISHA 
WARNER, :MILTON TWIT-
CHELL and ROSCOE E. HA1f-
:JIOXD, as the duly appointed and 
acting commissioners thereof, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE 
NO. 7154 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter reaches this court h:' writ of certiorari 
from the State Tax Commission. The controversy in-
'\'olves a Use Tax a:;;sPssment by the State Tax Com-
mission, and the case \Y8!S submitted to the commission 
upon an agreed statement of fact~ (Tr. 34-39) whirh, 
Jn·ipfl)' ~ummarized, are as follovv~: 
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The appellant, Whitmore Oxygen Company, is a 
local manufacturing company engaged in the manufac-
ture and ;sale of oxygen, ace'tylene and other bottled 
gases (Tr. 32). The Linde Air Products Company is an 
Ohio corporation, doing business in Utah, and has its 
manufacturing plant :at Speedway, Indiana (Tr. 32, 36). 
The two companies are -competitors in the local market. 
On Ap.ril 18, 1941, the companies entered into a 
written contract (Tr. 36-39), under the terms of which 
the Linde Company agreed to sell and the Whitmore 
Company agreed to buy a quantity of acetylene cylinders 
at an agreed price of $34,600.00. Payment was to be 
made by the Whitmore Company in monthly instalments, 
beginning thirty (30) days after delivery, and title to 
the cylinders was to remain in the Linde Company until 
the entire purchase price was paid (Tr. 38). The pur-
chase price was set as being an amount certain per 
cylinder, f. o. b. Speedway, Indiana (Tr. 36), and the 
contract and record is silent as to the place of delivery 
and freight coS't. 
The contract was fully performed by the parties. 
Linde made delivery of the cylinders in the Fall of 1941, 
\Vhitmore made his first monthly payment on Deeemher 
1, 1941 (Tr. 37) and paid the balance in full on March 
30, 1943, at which time title to the cylinders passed Wl-
equivocally to. the Whitmore Company (Tr. 33, 37). On 
November 21, 1947 (Tr. 1), nearly six years after de-
livery of the cylinders, and more than four yeaTs after 
title to the cylinders passed to the Whitmore Cmnpany. 
the Tax Commission made the deficiency Use rrax af'sess-
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m~n t romplained of in thes~ proceedings. 
During the entire period involved, that is, fron1 
January 1, 1~)41 to the date of the deficiency assessment 
in 1947, the "l1itmore Company had filed with the Tax 
Con1mission ~Yery two months the commission's Form 
71 (Tr. 34), which form is designated by the Tax Com-
:mlssion as a '•Sales Tax and Use Tax Return" (Tr. 35). 
Earh return "~as rertified to by the company in the fol-
lowing language as required by the Tax Commission : 
(Tr. 35) 
'·I HEREBY CERTIFY, That I have exam-
ined this return and that the statements made 
and the figures shown herein and in any accom-
panying schedules are to the best of my knowledge 
and belief a ·true and complete return, made in 
good faith for the period stated, pursuant to the 
Emerg·ency Revenue Act of 1933, as amended, 
and the Use Tax Act of 1937 and regulations 
issued under authority of both acts. 
Whitmore Oxygen Co. 
X arne of business or taxpayer 
C. A. Pingree 
Agent, or officer if corporation, 
trustee, etc. 
Asst. .Mgr. 
Title 
" 
The \Vhitmore Ox~,gen Company has paid to the 
Tax Commission at two month intervals during all the 
period from 1941 to 1947, the total amount of Sales Tax 
and Use Tax shown to be due upon line eleven ( 11) of 
the various returns (Tr. 34). Notwithstanding these 
faet:-;, stipulated to be true as they are, the Tax Com-
JIIi.'i·~·irm found tlwt thf 'Whitm,orc ().rygen Comrm11y had 
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never filed a Use Tax Return at any time between J amu-
ary 1, 1941 and December 31, 1946 (Finding No. 2, Tr. 
47). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The Tax Commission erred in its finding ''That 
~the taxpayer filed no Use Tax Returns during the period 
January 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946. '' (Finding No. 2, 
Tr. 47). 
2. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find 
that the deficiency Use Tax assessment was barred by 
the provisions of Title 104-2-24.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1943. 
3. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find 
that the deficiency Use Tax assessment was barred by 
the provisions of Title 104-2-30, Utah Code Annotatell 
1943. 
4. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find that 
the proposed deficiency was barred by the provisions of 
Title 80-15-8. 
5. The Tax Commission erred in failing to find that 
the sale in question was specifically exempt from taxa-
tion by virtue of the provisions of Title 80-16-4 ( cl). 
6. The Tax Commission erred in finding that the 
sale was consummated in the State of Indiana. 
7. The Tax Commission erred in its finding that 
the sale in question was one in interstate commerce. 
8. The Tax Commission erred in concluding 1that 
the taxpayer is liable to the Tax Commi~sion for U st· 
Tax in the amount of $1246.81, or in any other sum. 
9. The Tax Commission erred in its eoncln~~ion Xo 
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1, in that the Inatters ~set forth therein are contradictory 
and incompatible. 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
Two general questions are presented upon this ap-
peal: 
1. Does the ta."'{payer 's procedure in filing the Tax 
Commission's Form 71 constitute the filing of a Utse Tax 
Return Y If answered in the affirmative, it follows, we 
submit, that the assessment of the Commission is barred 
by each of several statutes of limitation, and no further 
question need be considered. If answered in the negative, 
additional problems are presented. 
2. Is the sale of personal property evidenced by 
the "\Yhitmore-Linde contract subject to a tax under the 
Use Tax Art '? 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 
In this brief, appellant will present the following 
points: 
1. The taxpayer has filed with the Tax Commission 
every two months, the Commission's Form 71, and the 
purported deficiency Use Tax assessment is barred by the 
provisions of each of several ~tatutes of limitation. 
2. The sale P\-ridenced by the Whitmore-Linde con-
trart was either: 
(a) }fade in the State of Utah ancl, therpfm·P, 
subject to Sales Tax rather than lT se Tax, or (b) made 
in Indiana and specifically exempt under the proYisions 
of the Use Tax Act because subject to the Gross In-
(•ome Tax Act of Indiana. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Although the Whitmore Company has coMist-
ently filed with the Tax Commission its Form 71, desig-
na'ted by the Commission as !a "Sales Tax and Use Tax 
Return,'' the Commission has ruled that the taxpayer's 
failure to completely fill out the form by omitting to 
write "0" on certain lines of the form, constitutes a 
failure of the taxpayer to file a Use Tax return at all. 
The filing of a return is the incident precedent to the 
'starting point of the statute of limitations running in 
favor of the taxpayer and, consequently, the Commission 
has claimed the right to audit for Use Tax without limi-
tation. The Sales Tax audit was only for the period 
1944-47 (tr. 32), the 1three-year period allowed by the 
provisions of Title 80-15-8, and the Commission ha~ con-
ceded that Form 71 as filed constitutes a Sales rrax 
return regardless of the fact that many blanks relative 
to Sal~s Tax, including all of the questions contained on 
the back of the form ( tr. 35) are not filled in. \\~ e beliP\'(' 
the position of the Commission to be both inconsistent 
and erroneous. 
What good would it do to have had the taxpayPr 
write '' 0'' upon each of the lines on the face of the 
return~ The net result of the return would have been 
the same; the auditing result -would have been the ~alnP: 
~the administrative problems would have been the same: 
the taxpayer's liability would have been the SallH'. rrll 
write "0" in the blanks would have been a useles1s gP~­
ture, and it is an ancient maxim that the law does 110l 
require a person to do a useless thing. 
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Th~ intent of the taxpayer to have Form 71 consti-
tute a Use Tax return would not be aided by the addition 
of zeros throughout the return. The intent of the tax-
payer is clear by his designation on line 11 of the return 
"·here he states the total amount of Sales and Use Tax 
due, and is clin1axed by his formal certification that the 
return is true and complete for both Sales and Use Tax. 
In Zellerbach Paper Company v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 
at 180, 79 L. Ed. at 269, ~the Supreme Court of the United 
8tates, speaking through ~[r. Justice Cardoza, In con-
sidering the Internal Revenue Act, states: 
_''Perfect accuracy or completeness is not 
necessary to rescue a return from a nullity if it 
purports to be a return, is sworn to as such, and 
evidences an honest and genuine endeavor to 
satisfy the law.'' 
Applying this rule to the instant case we have no 
hesitancy in maintaining that Form 71 as filed every two 
Inonths by the Whitmore Company is not a nullity rela-
tive to U ~e Tax. The form is furnished by the Tax Com-
m~ssion, and that hody is solely responsible for its form. 
It is labeled a "Sales and Use Tax Return," is the 
standard one furnished taxpayers such as the Whitmore 
Company, and is consistently referred to as a ''return'' 
in the singular. Had the T·ax Commission considered or 
t1P:..:ired the form to be othenYise than a return for bqth 
tuxt~.~. tlw:v could have easily changed the wording to so 
indicate. Had the Tax Cummission thought it necessan· 
to have the taxpayer fill the form with zero~ where ap-
plicable, they could have so indicated. The words "if 
none, Ro indicate" are common instructions on Inany 
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forms. But the Commission chose Form 71 and the 
wording thereof, and the taxpayers have a right to rely 
on the form's appearance and apparent purpose, that is, 
that it i:s a ''Sales and Use Tax Return.'' And when a 
taxpayer certifies that the form cons,titutes a true and 
complete return for both taxes, his duty is fulfilled. He 
has filed a return for both taxes. 
The Sales Tax and Use Tax are complimentary 
taxes ·so related one with the other that to effectuate 
the general purpose of the taxes, this court has held that 
certain exemptions. found in the Sales Tax Act, but not 
in the Use A0t, apply nevertheless to the Use Tax Act. 
Union Portland Cement Company v. Tax Com-
mission, ______ Utah ______ , 176 P. 2d 879. 
The two taxes, though written separately for necessit~:, 
are intended to provide a comprehensive taxing s~·stem 
upon the use, storage and consumption of personal prop-
erty in this state. See Douglas Aircraft ComJW11JJ v . 
.Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 90 P. 2d 572. 
Now, because the two taxes are so clcrsE,ly n·lated 
and are in fact just one comprehensive taxing systeu1, 
the taxpayer cannot be called upon to distinguish care-
fully between each tax separately. This is particularly 
evident in the instant case as will subsequently appPar in 
ou.r discussion as to which tax is applicable, if any, to 
the sale involved in this case. The close and extrPmely 
technical distinction between the application of HlP two 
taxes is totally beyond the average taxpayer's knowledg" 
and in many cases will be doubtful, even should the tax-
payer seek the most expert of advirP. This faet hn~ 
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been recognized by the Tax Conunission in choowsing 1the 
form of Form 71, and is further recognized in its Regu-
lation No. 1, wherein it is stated: 
''. . . The two taxes are compensating taxes, 
one supplementing the other, but both cannot he 
applicable to the same 'transaction. The rate of 
each tax is the same and it is, therefore, usually 
unnecessary to determine ·which tax is technically 
applicable." 
Because of these matters, taxpayers cannot and are 
not required to distinguish between the taxes, and it is 
the wise and proper thing to have the taxpayers file one 
return for the two taxes. But having chosen the fonn 
and indicating that it is a return for both taxes, we 
submit the Tax Commission cannot now say that a tax-
payer is not, as "Jir. Justice Cardoza says, "making a 
genuine endeavor to satisfy the law," when the taxpayer 
certifies that the return is for both taxes, but neglects 
to fill in some useles~ zeros in some lines of the form. 
\Ye believe that the \Vhitmore Company has clearly 
met every test as laid down by Mr. Justice Cardoza. 
Form 71 purports to be a Use Tax return. It is sworn 
to a~ such hy the Whitmore Company and constitutes an 
honest and geniune endeavor to satisfy a moist compli-
cated and hard-to-distinguish system of taxation. The 
:came method of filing has been used by the \Yhitmore 
Company since the effective date of the Use Tax in 1937, 
without prior complaint or criticism. A multitude of 
other taxpayers endeaYnring to satisfy the la,,~ and the 
requirements of the Tax Commission havr undoubted!~, 
filed the ::arne r'orm in the samP mamwr. 
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2. As we have pointed out, if the court concludel5 
that the Whitmore Company has made ''an honest and 
genuine endeavor to satisfy the law'' in the filing of 
Form 71, no consideration need be given to other matters 
presened in this appeal; however, should the court reach 
a contrary conclusion, the question of which tax, sales 
or use, if either, is applicable to the Whitmore-Linde 
'transaction must be considered. As the court pointed out 
at Union Portland Cement Company v. State. Tax Corn-
mission, ______ Utah ...... , 170 P. 2d 164 (original opinion), 
ordinarily the situs of a sale is where the act is per-
formed or the event occurs which operates to vest title 
in the buyer. Under the expre,ss terms of the Whitmore-
Linde contract (tr. 38), title was retained in the Linde 
Company until the purchase price was paid. Cow;<·-
quently, the actual passing of title to the tanks passed 
,,-hile the goods were in Whitmore's possession in Utah 
and title passed in Utah. The designation in the eontrart 
(tr. 36) of a purchase price, f.o.b. Speedwa~,, Indiana, 
did in no way change that fact. A sale contract expressly 
providing that title to property shall remain in the ~PH<:'l' 
until the property is paid for is not affected by a prOYI-
sion to deliver f.o.h. point ~of shipment, and title remain~ 
in the seller regardless of deliYel')'. 
Colles v. Lake Cities Electric Company, 22 Indi-
ana Appeals 86, 53 N. E. 256. 
Petersburg Firebrick Company v. Ameriean Chl~' 
Company, 89 Ohio 365, 106 )J_ E. 33. 
If the Sales Tax Act is applicable, the taxable inei-
dent was not the passage of title, but the transfer of 
possession due to the specific rnoYi~ions of Title 80-1;)-~ 
10 
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(b). '\vhich provides in part: 
'• ~-\ transaction ·whereby the possession of 
property is transferred, but the seller retains the 
title as security for the payment of the price shall 
be deemed a ,.sale.'' 
rrhe Use Tax Aet has a comparable provision relat-
ing to the definition of "purchase" (Title 80-16-2 (c)), 
but the provision here can affect only the tax basis and 
not the tax incident as the tax incident, regardless of 
"-here or "-hen title or possession pa~ses, is the use, 
storage or consumption of property in Utah. 
\Yhere, then, did the possession of the goods pass~ 
The record is silent as to where and when the Whitmore 
Company took possession of the goods and as to payment 
of freight charges from Indiana to Utah. The silence of 
the record in this regard is praetical evidence of the 
harshness of an administrative effort to tax a seven-
year-old transaction, and practical evidence of the fair-
ness of statutes of limitation for the protection of tax-
payers making conscientious effortis to comply with com-
plicated tax requirements. At this late date neither 
\Yhitmore nor Linde has available records relating to 
the transfer of possession of the tanks nor to the payment 
of freight charges nor reimbursements for such charges, 
if any there be. However, some of the contract provisions 
an .. helpful in determining the intent of the parties as 
to whPther the transaction was to be considered an 
Incljana or a Utah sale. 
Paragraph eight of the contract (tr. 39) provides 
that the validity, interpn~tation and performance of the 
('cntnwt slwuld be governed hy the law of Utah. rrlw 
11 
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place of performance of a contract is the state where 
the promise is to be performed. 
Beale Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, P.age 1259. 
This contract was made in Utah, as the acceptance 
was made by Whitmore in Sal~t Lake City (tr. 33), which 
act wa.s the final act necessary to make the cont:r~act 
binding (tr. 39), by the express provisions of the con-
tract. In the absence of contrary agreements or circum-
stances when no place of performance is fixed by a con-
tract, it will be presumed that the contract is to be 
performed where made. 
Lawson v. Tripp, 34 U·tah 28, 95 P. 520. 
This is especially true, and the presumption is stronger 
where the contract, as this one does, provides expressly 
that designated portions shall be performed at the plarP 
of contracting. 
Burr v. 'Western States Life of California, 296 P. 
273. 
The contract also contains a provision (Paragraph 
2, tr. 38) that Whitmore would pay on demand to Linde 
any Sales, Use or other excise tax for which Linde might 
be liable. If this transaction was intended by the partiPs 
to be a U~tah sale, the contract provision has rsome signifi-· 
cance for Linde would be liable for a sales tax. If, hov\'-
ever, the sale was intended as an Indiana sale, as the 
Tax Commission contends, and one in interstat<> eom-
merce, Linde could have no liability and the eontrad 
provision is meaningless. A case clearly in point and 
nearly identical in fact ~s found in Commonwealtl1 of 
Pennsylvania v. Wiloil Corporation, 316 Pa. 33, 17R A tl. 
12 
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404, 101 A. L. R. 287'. In that case the Wiloil Corporation, 
a Pennsylvania company, sold to cert~ain vendees located 
also in Pennsylvania, quantities of gasoline at a price 
f. o. b. \Yihnington, Delaware, with the specifi·c provision 
that the vendees would pay to 1the vendors the Pennsyl-
yania gasoline tax in ~addition to the amount set as the 
purchase price. In a suit by the State of Pen111sylvania 
to recover the gasoline tax, the Wiloil Company defended 
upon the al;sertion that title to the gasoline passed to the 
vendee at vVilmington and that as a consequence it 
wasn't 'a Pennsylvania sale. The court rejected that 
theory, stating: 
'• The first position assumed by appellant is 
that the title to the gasoline passed :to the pur-
chasers at \Yihnington, Del., and that they were 
the importers under the terms of the act and 
alone liable for the tax. The second position taken 
is that, if the title did not pass at Wilmington, 
deliYeries were made to the purchasers in Penn-
sylvania in tank cars, the original packages, that 
the shipments were at all times in interstate com-
merce and the charging of the tax to the seller is 
illegal, as it imposes a burden upon such com-
merce, and that, if that be the intent of the act, 
it is unconstituional. 
"Taking up the fir~t position, vve find that the 
Sa1P.s Act of l\fay 19, 1915, P. L. 543, Para. 18, 
69 PS Para-142, recognizes ~that the intention of 
the buyPr and the seller determines the time of 
the pa.~sage of title. For the purpose of ascer-
taining their intention, the act says regard shall 
lw had to the terms of the contract, the conduct 
of the parties, usages of trade, and the ci reum-
s!n nee~ of the case. 
"\Ve start with the fad that the sale wa-s 
13 
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actually made in Pennsylvania. The contention 
of appellant arises out of the circumstance that 
the price was fixed f. o. b. Wilmington. This, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that title passed 
there; particularly is this so in view of the in-
~tention of the parties evidenced by the provision 
in their contract that the vendees !should pay the 
tax to the vendors. If the parties contemplated 
that the ti1tle passed at Wilmington, outside Penn-
sylvania, :and the gasoline there belonged to the 
purchasers, it is difficult to un~erstand how the 
seller could have regarded its.elf as in any way 
liable for a Pennsylvania tax. As we view. it, the 
provision in the contract that the gasoline wa!s to 
be f. o. b. Wilmington was not intended to desig-
nate the place of delivery, but to fix the full price 
to be paid. This is shown by plaintiff's invoie<-~ 
offered in evidence, which, after setting forth the 
sale, contains the following: 'Price 5lj2 c gal. f. o. h. 
Wilmington, Del. plus 3c tax'.'' 
We submit, therefore, that the Whitmore-Linde 
transaction was a sale in Utah subject to the Sala-; rrax 
and improperly assessed by the Tax Commis~ion as a 
Use Tax. As the Com·mission states in its Sales and LT ~P 
Tax Regulation No. 1, "if the sale is made in Utah the 
Bales Tax applies. If the sale is made elsevdwre, the 
Use Tax applies." 
3. Even assuming, however, that the 1sale was an 
Indiana sale as found by the Commission in its Conchl-
sion No. 1 (tr. 47), the purported Use Tax asP-<'ssment 
was improper. Title 80-16-4 (d) provides an exemption 
upon ''property the gross receipts from the sale, di1stri-
bution or use of which are now subject to a sale or <>xeisP 
tax under the laws of the state or of some other ~ ta1 <' of 
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the United ~tnh's. '• 
If, as stated by the Commission's finding (tr. 47), 
.. the sale \Yals consummated in the s'tate of Indiana," it 
follows that the sale was subject to the Indiana Gross 
Income Tax ) •. ct of 1933, which act is in effect a general 
sales tax aet. 'Ye understand that the Tax Commission 
has long· interpreted the words ''subject to'' as found 
in Title 80-16-4 (d) as meaning ''subject to and actually 
paid.'' In other -vvordls, the T·ax Commission insiS'ts that 
a foreign sales tax be actually paid to a sister state in 
addition to the transaction being subject to the sales tax 
of a sister state. 'Vith this interpretation we have no 
s~~mpathy or patience. A misinterpretation of 'a statute, 
no matter how long continued by an administrative body, 
gin~'s no regularity to the interpretation. 
Utah Concrete Products v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 101 Utah 513, 125 P. 2d 408. 
,,~hen the Utah Legislature used the words "subject to," 
the intent of the law was and is clear, and an administra-
ti,~e body has no power to limit the exemption in such 
broad fashion by reading in additional limitations. Al-
though ,,.e have made no search of the Indiana law, the 
probability is tha;t there is ample authority that a trans-
action such as the Whitmore-Linde sale is not taxable 
in Indiana. This is true, we believe, because the Indiana 
authoriti~s could not successfully claim that the sale was 
''consummated in Indiana.'' However, any sale actually 
''consummated in Indiana'' would be subject to thPir 
Gro:-::-: Income r:I~ax Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the assessment of the Tax Commis-
sion is erroneous 'and unlawful from any approach made 
to the problem. We think it dear that the Whitmore 
Company has filed 1a Use Tax Return every 1two months 
since the Use Tax Act became effective, and that any 
purported asse'ssment upon a transaction occurring in 
1941 is barred by each of the following statutory pro-
visions: 
''Title 104-2-24.10. 
An action for a liability created by the statutes 
of this s~tate, other than for a penalty or for-
feiture under the la~ of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is pre-
scribed by the :statutes of this state, shall bt~ 
commenced within ~three years.'' 
''Title 104-2-30. 
An action for relief not otherwise provided for 
must be commenced within four years after the 
cause of action shall have accrued.'' 
We submit further that the assessment was made 
by the Tax Commission erroneously ~and unlawfully 
under the Use Tax Act when such act was not applicable, 
and upon a sale made in the state of Utah and subject 
to the Utah Sales Tax. In this regard i't is admitted, we 
think, that had the Tax Commission made the assessment 
under the Sales Tax Act, the asse~sment would have 
been barred by the Statutes of LimHations above set 
forth, and specifically barred, in addition, by the pro-
vi'sions of Title 80-15-8. 
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In conclusion we submit that even if Whitmore had 
filed no returns ·and if the Tax Commission had been 
correct in their finding that the s~ale was ''consummated 
in the state of Indiana,'' !still the assessment would have 
been unlawful and erroneous because the transaction, if 
consummated in Indiana, would have been subject to the 
Indiana Sales Tax and specifically exempt from U~tah 
taxation under the provisions of Title 80-16-4 (d). 
The order of the Tax Commission making the de-
ficiency assessment against the Whitmore Company 
should be reversed and the alsseS'sment held to be invalid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID T. LEWIS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Received a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
this -------------------- day of April, 1948. 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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